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Abstract
Political economy literature has so far failed to offer a consensus on the effect of political
institutions such as regime type (democracy vs. autocracy) and electoral systems (majori-
tarian vs. proportional representation) on within-country income inequality. Beyond the
inequality effects of these de jure political institutions, this paper finds robust evidence that
de facto distribution of political power crucially matters to income inequality. Based on a
panel database of 121 countries for the period from 1960 to 2007, the results consistently
associate even distributions of political power across socio-economic groups with lower levels
of income inequality. The scale of this effect hinges upon the proportionality of electoral
systems. However, regime type and electoral system are not consistently associated with a
significant impact on income inequality.
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1 Introduction
This paper looks at the distribution of political and economic power among citizens within coun-
tries. This research is motivated by the rising levels of income inequality, specifically in rich
democracies, over the last decades. It is facilitated by the current availability of data on both
income inequality and political equality across countries and time periods (Milanovic, 2000; Verba
and Orren, 1985). Although scholars differ on how to define and measure economic inequality,
they share a common concern about inequality which is intrinsically linked to social justice and
fairness. Further, any discussion on the cause and consequences of inequality should, as stated in
Bonica et al. (2013), include political and public policy considerations. In fact, the link between
political institutions and income inequality is at the core of democratic theory and political econ-
omy (Przeworski, 2010).
At first glance, democratic regimes might be expected to be more likely to implement inequality-
correcting policies and should thus be associated with lower levels of income inequality1. Against
this prior, empirical evidence shows that democratic governments coexist quite blithely with rising
levels of income inequality. The underlying arguments in the literature stress that societies are
divided along multifaceted cleavages that go beyond economic distribution (Roemer, 2009; Scheve
and Stasavage, 2017). Another reason underlying rising inequality in democracies is political cap-
ture by an elite through either de jure or de facto political institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2015).
Yet empirical literature on democracy and inequality seems far from reaching a consensus2.
One strand of political economy literature uses variation within democracies to study the inequal-
ity consequences of electoral systems, which are usually divided into majoritarian systems and
proportional representation systems (Lijphart, 2012). Austen-Smith (2000) observes that propor-
tional representation systems, usually characterized by more than two parties, exhibit higher tax
rates and flatter income distribution than the typical two-party majoritarian electoral systems.
Empirical research on these mechanisms tends to associate more proportional electoral systems
with lower levels of within-country income inequality (Birchfield and Crepaz, 1998; Verardi, 2005).
Nevertheless, the literature suggests a need for more complex specifications to give sound empirical
1The workhorse model of democracy-inequality literature is provided in Meltzer and Richard (1981), which has
been widely challenged both by theoretical and empirical scholarship (Benabou, 2000; Milanovic, 2000)
2Empirical research associates democracy with either a negligible or increasing effects on income inequality
(Dreher and Gaston, 2008; Scheve and Stasavage, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2015)
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leverage to the link between electoral systems and income inequality.
This paper argues that de facto distribution of political power might -at the very least- distort
the impact of de jure political institutions (e.g. regime type and electoral systems) on inequality.
The distribution of political power across socio-economic positions, i.e. political equality, refers
to the extent to which members of a polity possess equal political power (Pemstein et al., 2015).
Policy outcomes, and thus inequality, might crucially depend on the distribution of power (Ace-
moglu et al., 2015). By studying political equality we test whether democratic institutions fail to
implement inequality-correcting policies due to political capture by an elite (e.g. economic elite).
Existing empirical analyses are silent about the role of political equality on income inequality,
mainly due to the complexity of measuring the phenomenon (Verba and Orren, 1985; Bartels,
2017). This paper adds to the literature by employing a novel measure of political equality taken
from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Database. Although they have similar roots, democracy
-as a political regime type- and political equality are in fact two separate concepts. As I argue
here, the difference between them stems from the de jure nature of the former and the de facto
nature of the latter. Descriptively, the data on political equality employed here varies substantially
across democracies. This suggests that not all democracies perfectly represent individuals from all
socio-economic positions, which is a recurrent claim in the field (Gilens and Page, 2014; Bartels,
2009; Houle, 2018).
The aim of this paper is to test whether the interplay between de jure political institutions (e.g.
democracy and electoral systems) and the de facto distribution of political power affects within-
country income inequality. More precisely, I surmise that the effect of electoral systems on income
inequality hinges upon political equality. To estimate this relationship, I specify fixed-effects in-
teractive models using a panel of 121 countries for the period from 1960 to 2007. The main results
suggest that increasing political equality reduces income inequality. This effect is greater in ma-
joritarian electoral systems than in proportional representation systems. The estimates do not
associate political regimes and electoral systems with significant effects on inequality, although
more proportional parliaments may reduce inequality in advanced economies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the hypothesis. Section 3 ex-
plains the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 shows the main findings and Section 5 checks
the sensitivity of the results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Stylized facts and hypothesis
The prevailing wisdom among scholars entails strong stylized facts about the effects of electoral
systems on the economy at large, and on redistribution and inequality in particular. This body
of research speaks to the sensitivity of governments to cater to different groups in the electorate,
which may in turn lead to different levels of income inequality. The features of electoral sys-
tems have been studied for instance on the basis of geographic concentration (Rickard, 2012) and
strength of lobbying activities (Naoi and Krauss, 2009). Other inequality effects of electoral sys-
tems have been established on the basis of trade-oriented economies (Kono, 2009), the political
representation of minorities (Norris et al., 2004), and left vs. right leaning of governments (Iversen
and Soskice, 2006). Overall, the evidence tends to show that proportional representation systems
have greater redistribution and public spending than majoritarian systems (Persson and Tabellini,
2004; Persson et al., 2007; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001). It follows that proportional systems should
be associated with lower income inequality.
Verardi (2005) focuses on the effect of district magnitude of electoral systems on income inequal-
ity. Using data on 28 countries and a four-year time span, he finds that when the degree of
proportionality increases, income inequality decreases. Along similar lines, Birchfield and Crepaz
(1998) considers the larger number of effective parties under proportional representation than in
majoritarian systems to study the link between electoral systems and income inequality. Using
data on 18 countries at two points in time, they find that proportional representation systems
(majoritarian systems) are associated with lower (higher) income inequality.
Nonetheless, policy outcomes and inequality depend not only on de jure but also on de factor
political institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2015). This argument is theoretically modelled by Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2008), who show that changes in de jure political institutions (e.g. electoral
systems) create incentives for former or new elites to invest in de facto political power to offset
those changes.
”De facto power is often essential for the determination of economic
policies and the distribution of economic resources, but it is not allocated by
institutions; rather, it is possessed by groups as a result of their wealth, weapons,
or ability to solve the collective action problem. A change in political institutions
that modifies the distribution of de jure power need not lead to a change in
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equilibrium economic institutions if it is associated with an offsetting change
in the distribution of de facto political power (e.g., in the form of bribery, the
capture of political parties, or use of paramilitaries)”. (Ibid., 2008: 268)
Here, I hypothesize that whatever effect changes between proportional and majoritarian
systems may exert on income inequality, it must be contingent upon the distribution of political
power. In a sense, the current paper may serve as an empirical test for the theoretical model of
Acemoglu and Robinson. I estimate the joint effect of changes in electoral systems (as a de jure
political institution) and political equality (as a de facto political institution) on within-country
income inequality. The data coverage used and the complexity of the mechanism proposed here
are intended to supplement previous approaches to examine the effects that electoral systems in
particular, and political institutions at large, exert on income inequality.
3 Data and Empirical Analysis
I estimate combined cross-country time-series regressions using data for 121 countries over the
period from 1960 to 2007. The dependent variable is within-country household gross income in-
equality, also known as market income inequality, which refers to income inequality before taxes
and transfers. Gross income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient taken from the version
5.1 of the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). The Gini coefficients are
provided in percentage terms, ranging theoretically from 0 (perfectly equal income distribution)
to 100 (one household possesses all the income in the country). The SWIID methodology uses
multiple imputations to extend the UNU-WIDER homogeneous inequality series for missing data
(Solt, 2016).
The primary goal of the SWIID is to meet the needs of cross-national comparisons, enabling schol-
ars to overcome the well-known limitations regarding country and time coverage, harmonization
of definitions, and other shortcomings. The SWIID also provides the Gini net coefficient of in-
come inequality (post-tax, post-transfer), and measures of absolute redistribution (market-income
inequality minus net-income inequality) and relative redistribution (market-income inequality mi-
nus net-income inequality, divided by market-income inequality). The data on these alternative
measures of inequality and redistribution are used as dependent variables in subsequent Sections
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to check the sensitivity of the main results.
The imputation model employed by Solt (2016) provides a substantial data coverage in terms of
countries and time periods. However, it comes at the cost of potential bias and precisions issues
(Jenkins, 2015). Hence, I check the external validity of the main results by using the World Bank
All the Ginis Database (Milanovic, 2014) as an alternative data source on income inequality3.
I propose the following interactive fixed-effects model to estimate the effects of political equality,
electoral systems and the interaction between them on the distribution of income.
Yct = β0 + β1PolEqc,t−1 + β2PRc,t−1 + β3PolEqc,t−1 ∗ PRc,t−1 + αXc,t−1 + uct
uct = δc + γt + ct
c = country; t = year
(1)
where the dependent variable Yct is gross Gini in logarithms, using SWIID unless otherwise stated,
in country c in year t. The focal explanatory variables are political equality (PolEq) and propor-
tional representation (PR) in year t− 1. Xc,t−1 stands for a set of control variables in year t− 1,
and δc and γt are country and time fixed-effects respectively. All the models include clustered
standard errors at country level to accurately account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
Overall, this specification aims to correct previous research by controlling for country fixed-effects,
since its omission might give false results due to omitted variable bias, as noted in Acemoglu et al.
(2015). The data sources, sample of countries and summary statistics are relegated to Tables A1
and A2 in the Appendix.
A note of caution should be struck regarding reverse causality issues. Political institutions are able
to profoundly shape the economy through policy platforms, but economic actors have a massive
impact on the workings of political authority (Hacker and Pierson, 2010). To alleviate this con-
cern, all the independent variables are one period lagged. Section 5.4 tackles the issue of reverse
causality in detail.
3I also used the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) data on household income inequality, which are
not included here to save space but are available upon request.
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3.1 Independent variables
3.1.1 Electoral systems
Electoral systems are measured by means of a dichotomous variable which is set to one for propor-
tional representation systems (PR, hereafter) and zero otherwise (majoritarian or mixed systems),
taken from Bormann and Golder (2013) database. During the period considered in the estimations
(1960-2007), the countries in the database underwent 29 electoral changes, as shown in Table A4
in the Appendix.
Figure 1: Income Inequality by Electoral System
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
G
in
i g
ro
ss
 (%
)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
non-PR PR
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
G
in
i n
et
 (%
)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
non-PR PR
Figure 1 shows the changes over time in the gross and net Gini coefficients for PR and
non-PR systems for 1960-2015. It shows that income inequality moves similarly under the two
types of system. PR countries show slightly higher levels of gross income inequality, but lower
levels of net income inequality than non-PR countries. The literature finds that the banking crisis
may be an important driver of income inequality (De Haan and Sturm, 2017). Consequently,
I restrict the data to the years prior to the Great Recession and the estimations use data for
1960-2007.
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3.1.2 Political equality
The V-Dem project defines political equality as the extent to which political power is evenly
distributed according to socio-economic groups of individuals4. As the V-Dem codebook states,
the conceptualization of political equality is built on the real political power that a group of
individuals wield on the basis of whether they a) actively participate in politics (by voting, etc. et
al.); b) are involved in civil society organizations; c) secure representation in government; d) are
able to set the political agenda; e) influence political decisions; and f) influence the implementation
of those decisions (Pemstein et al., 2015).
Country experts are instructed to use a continuous scale from 0 to 4 to assign the distribution
of political power among the citizenry based on different socio-economic groups. Starting from 0
(wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power), 1 (wealthy people enjoy a dominant
hold on political power), 2 (wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power), 3 (wealthy
people have more political power than others), and 4 (wealthy people have no more political power
than those whose economic status is average or poor). The observation with the lowest level of
political equality is that for Ukraine in 2000 (0.094) and the highest is for Sweden in 1983 (3.799).
Figure 2: Political Equality and Income Inequality (2005)
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Figure 2 shows the measure of political equality and gross and net Gini coefficients of
4For the purposes of this research, I focus on socio-economic groups. The V-Dem dataset also provides data on
the political equality of groups of individuals according to social groups (e.g. caste, ethnicity, language, religion),
gender and sexual orientation.
8
income inequality. In both cases, higher levels of political equality among socio-economic groups
are related to lower levels of income inequality. The appendix also includes scatter plots on political
equality and redistribution (Figure A1).
3.1.3 Control variables
Xct in Equation (1) includes a set of control variables. The specification controls for a political
regime dummy for democratic regimes in country c in period t taken from Boix et al. (2013) (BMR
hereafter). The inclusion of this variable is crucial to disentangle the effect of political equality
from the type of political regime. A country is considered democratic if it satisfies conditions for
both contestation i) ”The executive is directly or indirectly elected in popular elections and is
responsible either directly to voters or to a legislature”; ii) ”the legislature (or the executive if
elected directly) is chosen in free and fair elections”, and participation iii) ”a majority of adult
men has the right to vote” (Boix et al., 2013).
With this definition, the difference between democracy and political equality is straightforward.
Figure 3 shows that despite the generally higher levels of political equality under democracies
(BMR equals 1), both democratic and non-democratic countries show similar trends in political
equality from 1960- to 2007. It is worth noting that the minimum figure for political equality
in non-democracies is higher than in democracies, and that the variability in political equality is
greater for democracies than for non-democracies (see Table A6 in the Appendix). As highlighted
Figure 3: Political Equality by Political Regime
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in Acemoglu et al. (2015), the duration of democratic history is neither tackled nor recognized in
the extant literature. Although it lies beyond the scope of the current paper, the link between
historical democratic experience and income inequality seems an important feature in isolating
the inequality effect of political equality. Thus, in subsequent models I include the number of
consecutive years of democratic experience of countries (Age of democracy), also taken from the
Boix et al. (2013) database.
Concern must be shown for collinearity issues arising from the relationship between the political
institutional variables included in the model. Table A5 in the Appendix shows pair-wise corre-
lations between political equality, regime type (BMR), electoral systems (PR), and duration of
democratic experience. None of these correlations posits a problem in the estimations and they
further corroborate the split between the concept of democracy and political equality.
The models include the logarithms of level and squared of gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita. The so-called inverted-U shaped relationship between economic development and inequal-
ity formalized by Kuznets (1955) states that income inequality first increases in the course of
economic development, then peaks, and then decreases. However, there is growing evidence to
support a U-shape rather than an inverted U-shape relationship between economic development
and inequality (Dreher and Gaston, 2008), suggesting that inequality is high for low levels of devel-
opment, decreases in the course of economic development and increases again in aﬄuent countries.
Indeed, Lessmann and Seidel (2017) explore the non-linearity of the GDP-inequality linkage in the
context of regional inequality and find a cubic function by which GDP might have an N-shaped
effect on inequality. This possibility is also considered in the set of regressions below.
I follow standard literature on income inequality to control for the educational attainment of the
population, the dependency ratio, the inflation rate and trade openness. Education is measured
by the average number of years of education of the population over 15 year-old, and the depen-
dency ratio is measured by the ratio of people over 65 years-old to the total population. Empirical
evidence suggests that increasing human capital is associated with reducing income distribution
(Gregorio and Lee, 2002). By contrast, a larger proportion of elderly people is associated with
an inequality-enhancing effect (Deaton and Paxson, 1998). For inflation, Bul´ıˇr (2001) finds a
non-linear effect of inflation on income inequality by which reductions from hyperinflation tend to
reduce inequality, while very low levels of inflation are associated with a negligible or increasing
effect in income inequality. For trade openness, which is included in the models as exports and
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imports as proportion of GDP, the literature is inconclusive. Indeed, economic globalization might
have different effects on developed and developing countries (Dreher and Gaston, 2008).
I seek to supplement previous research on the effect of electoral institutions on income inequality
by controlling for additional financial globalization features. The final set of controls refers to the
growing evidence that different components of financial globalization might have opposite effects
on income inequality (Asteriou et al., 2014). I explore here whether the results are affected by the
inclusion of composite measures of economic globalization (using the KOF index of economic glob-
alization), or different components of economic globalization, such as stock market capitalization
and foreign direct investment (FDI), as a percentage of GDP in both cases.
4 Results
Table 1 shows the estimates of Equation (1) using the annual gross Gini coefficient as the dependent
variable. Generally, the results suggest that increasing political equality, the age of democracy,
and financial indicators are determinants of income inequality.
Column (1) shows estimates of a model on PR and political equality without its interaction and a
subset of controls that do not consider financial indicators. Political equality is always associated
with a statistically significant coefficient, but PR is not associated with a significant effect on
income inequality. GDP per capita in levels is generally associated with an inequality-decreasing
effect, as in Dreher and Gaston (2008). However, the squared GDP per capita is not associated
with a significant effect. These results remain when the KOF index of economic globalization
(Column 2) and decomposed indicators of financial internationalization are considered (Column
3). The estimates suggest that the stock market is significant, so the subsequent models include
that covariate. The direction of this finding points to an inequality-reducing effect of the stock
market, as found in Asteriou et al. (2014). As regards other control variables, most of the mod-
els estimated point to a reducing-effect of educational attainment and an increasing effect of the
dependency ratio on income inequality. Both associations are consistent with previous studies.
Inflation is associated with an increasing but small effect on inequality.
Column (4) includes the interaction between PR and political equality. The constitutive term of
political equality remains statistically significant and PR remains not significant. However, the
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interaction is significant, meaning that the effect exerted by political equality on income inequality
depends on the electoral system used in each country. The positive sign of the interaction means
that the inequality-reducing effect associated with political equality is lower when countries are
PR. Note that BMR is never associated with a significant role in inequality. Consistently with the
model by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), de facto distribution of power has a stronger effect on
inequality than changes in de jure political institutions. Indeed, based on the results here, changes
in electoral institutions (PR and non-PR) are not associated with a significant effect on income
inequality. To the contrary, political equality is robustly associated with an inequality-diminishing
effect.
The preferred model is estimated in Column (5), which controls for the democratic experience
rather than the political regime index (BMR). The political regime dummy was not associated
with a significant coefficient, but the age of democracy is associated with a positive and signifi-
cant effect on income inequality. Therefore, this results suggests that the cumulative democratic
experience has an inequality-increasing effect.
The inequality-increasing effect associated with greater democratic experience can be interpreted
along the lines of the so-called sclerotic hypothesis of Olson (1982). Scholars working in democracy-
growth literature find a negative impact of the longer democratic experience on economic growth
rates. It is suggested that democratising countries are likely to pursue growth-enhancing reforms
in the short-run but may abandon them with the passage of time (Olson, 1982; Przeworski, 1991).
Applying the sclerotic hypothesis to the context of income inequality, early stages of the democra-
tization process may have an economic equalization effect that then vanishes over time, resulting
in a cumulative negative effect of democratic experience on within-country income inequality.
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Figure 4: Marginal Inequality Effects of Political Equality
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The point estimates in Column (5) of Table 1 imply that a unit increase in political
equality last year decreases the gross Gini coefficient at the current year by about 7.2% under
non-PR electoral systems. Figure 4 shows more clearly the marginal effects of a unit increase
in political equality conditional upon each type of electoral system. In both cases more political
equality is associated with a reducing effect in income inequality, but it is smaller reduced under
PR systems. Under PR systems, one additional unit in the political equality score is associated
with a reducing income inequality of about 2.8%.
Column (6) in Table 1 controls for the cubic function of GDP per capita to study the N-Shape
relationship between economic development and income inequality. The estimates seem to provide
leverage for the findings in Lessmann and Seidel (2017) in the context of regional inequality.
However, the coefficient associated with GDP per capita in levels is remarkably large, so I do
not include the N-shape conjecture in subsequent models. Nevertheless, the results for the core
variables of this research remain unaltered.
5 Sensitivity Checks
This Section follows in the footsteps of the sensitivity checks usually conducted in the existing
literature on income inequality. I first use alternative data sources, measures of income inequality
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and redistribution. Second, I split the sample of countries into OECD and non-OECD countries.
Third, I explore whether social or political globalization and features of voter turnout alter the
main findings of the current research. Finally, I check the issue of reverse causality. Overall, the
finding that political equality has a reducing effect on income inequality is consistent throughout
the empirical analyses conducted in this paper.
5.1 Alternative data sources and measures of inequality
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 use data on income inequality taken from the All the Ginis
database. Column (1) uses the logarithm of gross Gini coefficient as the dependent variable while
Column (2) uses the logarithm of net Gini coefficient. The results associate both political equality
and changes towards PR systems with reducing effects on income inequality, while the interaction
between them remains significant and positive. However, it should be noted that the number of
countries included in All the Ginis database, and thus the number of observations in these regres-
sions is remarkably lower than when the SWIID is used.
Column (3) (Table 2) uses the logarithm of net Gini coefficients collected from SWIID as the
dependent variable. In this case political equality is associated with a significant role in reducing
inequality, but PR and the interaction between them are not significant. Columns (4) and (5) fur-
ther explore the workings of political equality and redistribution by using as dependent variables
the relative and absolute redistribution measures, respectively. De facto distribution of political
power is associated with lower redistribution at 0.1 and 0.05 levels of significance. However, the
interaction between political equality and PR is significant at the 0.05 level only for the case of rel-
ative redistribution, suggesting that increasing political equality enhances redistribution provided
that the country has a PR system. As for the control variables, the U-shape function of GDP
per capita seems to apply in redistribution, while the dependency ratio increases redistribution
in both relative and absolute terms. Ultimately, the alternative results provide some empirical
clues that political equality might be at the heart of both redistribution and income inequality in
electoral democracies.
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5.2 OECD versus non-OECD economies
Table 3 provides further sensitivity checks on the main results of the paper. Previous research has
observed differences in the workings of the democracy-inequality between OECD and non-OCED
countries, with the link being found to be stronger in OECD countries (Dreher and Gaston, 2008).
Indeed, my results might serve to clarify this previous evidence.
Columns (1) and (2) (Table 3) use OECD and non-OECD countries separately to run the model
in Equation (1). I focus on the results for the marginal effects of political equality under PR and
non-PR separately for the two subsamples, which are shown in Figure 5. The impact of increas-
ing political equality in depressing income inequality seems to be stronger in OECD countries.
Consistently with my previous results, the pro-income-equality effect of political equality is lower
under PR. The point estimates suggest that in OECD countries increasing a one unit increase
in political equality in the preceding year has an impact of -9.1% on income inequality in the
current year under non-PR and of -8.1% under PR systems. For non-OECD countries, the effect
of political equality on income inequality is lower: -4.7% under non-PR and of -0.4% under PR
systems.
Figure 5: Inequality Marginal Effects of Political Equiality in OECD and non-OECD Countries
-
.
15
-
.
1
-
.
05
0
.
05
Ef
fe
ct
s 
in
 L
in
ea
r P
re
di
ct
io
n 
on
 G
in
i G
ro
ss
 (lo
g)
non-PR PR
OECD non-OECD
Average Marginal Effects of Political Equality (95% CIs)
Note that using the OECD subsample, the estimates associate both political equality
and PR with a significant, negative effect on income inequality. This suggests that electoral sys-
tems play a role in advanced economies. In the case of non-OECD countries, political equality
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is associated with a significant effect but the impact of PR is not significant. In both country
subsets, the interaction between political equality and electoral systems is significant. The results
confirm again that interplay between de jure and de facto political institutions may be an impor-
tant determinant of within-country income inequality. Furthermore, the split between OECD and
non-OECD countries may show that de jure institutions work differently depending on the level
of economic development of countries. However, the analysis of this triple interplay goes beyond
the scope of this paper.
In both subsamples, increasing democratic experience is associated with increasing levels of in-
come inequality, which provides further leverage for Olson’s sclerotic hypothesis applied to the
democracy-inequality link. Nonetheless, the OECD and non-OECD subsample show differences
in the estimates of other control variables. Education is not associated with a significant equal-
ization effect in advanced economies, which might be driven by the homogeneity of educational
attainment across OECD countries. In the non-OECD subsample, education is associated with
reducing income inequality. Similarly, the proportion of elderly people seems to increase inequality
in advanced economies but not in non-OECD countries. This may be related to population ageing
in the former group of countries.
5.3 Voter turnout, social and political globalization
Columns (3-6) in Table 3 expand the set of controls. I first check whether my results hold after
including the KOF index of social (Column 3) and political globalization (Column 4). As suggested
in Bergh and Nilsson (2010), a purely economic perspective on globalization might be too narrow in
analysing distributional effects across countries. They find significant effects of social globalization
on net Gini coefficients using SWIID in a panel of 80 countries for 1970-2005. Based on the
estimates presented here, none of these covariates is associated with a significant impact on income
inequality. Importantly, the main results associated with political equality and its interaction with
PR remain the same.
The relationship between inequality and electoral turnout seems to differ across countries. Less
developed and highly unequal societies are associated with higher turnouts, while more developed
countries are associated with lower turnouts (Amat and Beramendi, 2017). The mechanisms
behind political participation and inequality might be not fully captured by the measure of political
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equality. Therefore, Columns (5-6) include respectively voter turnout, taken from Vanhanen and
Lundell (2014) and non mandatory voting, taken from the V-Dem database. The results fail to
associate turnout features with a significant impact on income inequality, but the main results of
the paper remain unaltered.
5.4 Causality issues
The final step of the sensitivity check is to take further issue on reverse causality. Following
Acemoglu et al. (2015), Column (7) in Table 3 uses Equation (1) and regresses it using the fifth
lag of the independent variables. Notwithstanding that the effect of political equality remains,
the interaction is not significantly associated with an income inequality effect. Similar results are
found when 5-year averages are used for all variables in non-overlapping periods between 1980
and 2010, as proceed in Dreher and Gaston (2008). These further checks suggest that de facto
political institutions -such as the distribution of political power- might be a crucial determinant of
within-country income inequality, whereas de jure political institutions might have a minor impact
or none at all.
6 Conclusions
The starting point of this paper is the observation of rising income inequality in established democ-
racies. In theory, democratic governments should be able to correct for rising inequality through
the processes of enfranchisement and political competition. In practice, democracy and income
inequality have coexisted without undue concern over the last few decades. Indeed, the literature
is still inconclusive on the final effect of political institutions on income inequality. This paper
suggests that de jure political institutions such as political regimes (democracy vs. autocracy)
and electoral systems (majoritarian vs. proportional systems) play a minor role compared to the
de facto distribution of political power.
Earlier studies associate more proportional systems with lower levels of income inequality. How-
ever, I draw on the theoretical model in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) to argue that changes
towards supposedly pro-equality de jure political institutions might be offset if political power
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is not evenly distributed among the socio-economic groups that make up the electorate. In this
paper I show that political equality plays a stronger role than changes in electoral systems, which
might serve as an empirical test of Acemoglu and Robinson’s theoretical model.
I use the SWIID data on income inequality for a panel data of 121 countries for 1960-2007. I
link this data with a measure of political equality taken from the V-Dem database, along with
information on electoral systems and political regime type, and other inequality drivers already
proposed in the standard literature. My main findings associate political equality with a reducing
effect on income inequality. This effect is found to hinge upon electoral systems, which means that
political equality tends to exert a stronger effect under non proportional representation systems
than in proportional systems. In any case, the impact of greater political equality is associated
everywhere with an inequality-diminishing effect. The estimates fail to associate political regime
types per se with a significant impact on income inequality, although electoral systems are asso-
ciated with some explanatory power over income inequality in OECD countries.
This paper finds a robust partial and negative correlation between political equality and income
inequality that partly depends on the electoral system. Notwithstanding that these results have
a tentative causal interpretation under the usual assumptions of fixed-effects panel data models,
I cannot deny the possibility of omitted factors driving both political and economic inequality.
Likewise, a reverse causation from income inequality to political equality and electoral systems
cannot be ruled out (Acemoglu et al., 2015; Scheve and Stasavage, 2017).
Finally, the natural next step to extend this research is to consider whether political equality
among social groups, gender and sexual orientations (rather than among socio-economic groups)
also plays a role in the within-country income distribution. Additionally, it would be interesting
to consider other de jure political institutions rather than electoral systems.
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Tables of Results
Table 1: Baseline Models and Preferred Model
Dependent variable: SWIID gross Gini (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Political Equality -0.045∗∗ -0.036∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
L.PR 0.032 0.035 0.037 -0.060 -0.056 -0.062
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046)
L.Interaction 0.047∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
L.GDPpc (log) -0.360∗ -0.372 -0.211 -0.214 -0.209 5.535∗∗
(0.208) (0.234) (0.388) (0.384) (0.375) (2.773)
L.Squared GDPpc (log) 0.017 0.018 0.014 0.015 0.014 -0.632∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.315)
L.Cubic GDPpc (log) 0.024∗∗
(0.012)
L.BMR -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.019
(0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016)
L.Age of democracy 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
L.Education -0.010 -0.009 -0.056∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
L.Dependency ratio 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.014∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
L.Inflation 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.Trade 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
continues on next page
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Table 1: Baseline Models and Preferred Model
Dependent variable: SWIID gross Gini (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.KOFecon 0.001
(0.001)
L.Stock market -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.FDI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 5.608∗∗∗ 5.545∗∗∗ 4.805∗∗ 4.828∗∗∗ 4.810∗∗∗ -12.180
(0.894) (0.992) (1.828) (1.806) (1.757) (8.124)
No. of Obs. 2099 2039 1099 1099 1102 1102
No. of Groups 121.000 121.000 75.000 75.000 76.000 76.000
log-likelihood 2759.993 2715.767 1786.341 1796.589 1805.094 1812.373
Within R-squared 0.300 0.297 0.501 0.510 0.512 0.518
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Country-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Within-group estimates, year fixed-effects included but not reported.
Interactionct refers to the joint effect of Political Equality and Proportional Representation.
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Table 2: Alternative Data Sources and Measures
Dependent variable: Alternative inequality or redistribution measures
WIDER SWIID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
gross Gini net Gini net Gini Rel. Redis. Abs. Redis.
L.Political Equality -0.137∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -1.624∗ -1.719∗∗
(0.045) (0.053) (0.015) (0.881) (0.805)
L.PR -0.385∗∗ -0.468∗∗ -0.045 -5.668 -2.205
(0.147) (0.186) (0.045) (4.900) (3.685)
L.Interaction 0.145∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.021 3.340∗∗ 1.789
(0.054) (0.068) (0.019) (1.596) (1.216)
L.GDPpc (log) 1.513∗∗ 0.772 0.238 -49.253∗∗ -27.761∗∗
(0.719) (1.021) (0.341) (21.185) (13.085)
L.Squared GDPpc (log) -0.070∗ -0.033 -0.013 2.745∗∗ 1.549∗∗
(0.039) (0.055) (0.018) (1.170) (0.721)
L.Age of democracy 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003)
L.Education 0.070∗∗ 0.055∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.813 -0.822
(0.028) (0.030) (0.018) (1.181) (0.721)
L.Dependency ratio 0.019∗ 0.020∗ 0.002 1.230∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.409) (0.210)
L.Inflation 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
L.Trade 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.022 -0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.016) (0.011)
L.Stock market 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗ -0.000 -0.024∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.004)
L.FDI -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.041 -0.013
continues on next page
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Table 2: Alternative Data Sources and Measures
Dependent variable: Alternative inequality or redistribution measures
WIDER SWIID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
gross Gini net Gini net Gini Rel. Redis. Abs. Redis.
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.053) (0.034)
Constant -4.738 -0.914 2.707∗ 241.563∗∗ 135.927∗∗
(3.234) (4.680) (1.576) (94.603) (59.173)
No. of Obs. 353 386 1102 849 849
No. of Groups 46.000 52.000 76.000 51.000 51.000
log-likelihood 438.624 464.092 1878.907 -2035.022 -1568.453
Within R-squared 0.259 0.211 0.383 0.237 0.398
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Country-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Within-group estimates, year fixed-effects included but not reported.
Interactionct refers to the joint effect of Political Equality and Proportional Representation.
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Table 3: Sensitivity Checks
Dependent variable: Annual or 5-yr mean SWIID gross Gini (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OECD non-OECD KOFsoc KOFpol Turnout Non-mand 5-yr mean
L.Political Equality -0.092∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
L5.Political Equality -0.034∗∗ -0.050∗∗
(0.016) (0.020)
L.PR -0.144∗∗ -0.045 -0.058 -0.056 -0.066 -0.059
(0.069) (0.043) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.044)
L5.PR 0.006 -0.032
(0.049) (0.050)
L.Interaction 0.079∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.032) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
L5.Interaction 0.009 0.021
(0.018) (0.020)
L.GDPpc (log) -0.356 -0.374 -0.149 -0.190 -0.116 -0.174
L5.GDPpc (log) -0.722∗ -0.656∗
(0.408) (0.374)
(1.187) (0.871) (0.431) (0.381) (0.359) (0.343)
continues on next page
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Table 3: Sensitivity Checks
Dependent variable: Annual or 5-yr mean SWIID gross Gini (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OECD non-OECD KOFsoc KOFpol Turnout Non-mand 5-yr mean
L.Squared GDPpc (log) 0.018 0.027 0.011 0.013 0.009 0.012
(0.062) (0.052) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
L5.Squared GDPpc (log) 0.044∗ 0.041∗
(0.022) (0.021)
L.Age of democracy 0.000∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L5.Age of democracy 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
L.Education -0.032 -0.069∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
L5.Education -0.039∗∗ -0.035∗
(0.017) (0.019)
L.Dependency ratio 0.017∗∗ -0.015 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.015∗
(0.007) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
L5.Dependency ratio 0.013∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
continues on next page
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Table 3: Sensitivity Checks
Dependent variable: Annual or 5-yr mean SWIID gross Gini (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OECD non-OECD KOFsoc KOFpol Turnout Non-mand 5-yr mean
L.Inflation 0.001 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L5.Inflation 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000)
L.Trade -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L5.Trade -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
L.Stock market -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L5.Stock market -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
L.FDI 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
L5.FDI 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
continues on next page
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Table 3: Sensitivity Checks
Dependent variable: Annual or 5-yr mean SWIID gross Gini (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OECD non-OECD KOFsoc KOFpol Turnout Non-mand 5-yr mean
L.KOFsoc -0.001
(0.002)
L.KOFpol -0.001
(0.001)
L.Turnout -0.001
(0.001)
L.Non-compulsory voting 0.018
(0.034)
Constant 5.679 5.348 4.563∗∗ 4.736∗∗ 4.428∗∗∗ 4.634∗∗∗ 6.956∗∗∗ 6.616∗∗∗
(5.726) (3.722) (1.945) (1.798) (1.667) (1.596) (1.850) (1.671)
N 629 468 1097 1097 1093 1102 1089 302
R2 0.600 0.337 0.512 0.512 0.510 0.512 0.460 0.474
No. of Groups 34.000 41.000 76.000 76.000 76.000 76.000 75.000 76.000
log-likelihood 983.123 882.837 1796.795 1796.835 1790.821 1805.830 1909.092 529.086
Within R-squared 0.600 0.337 0.512 0.512 0.510 0.512 0.460 0.474
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
continues on next page
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Table 3: Sensitivity Checks
Dependent variable: Annual or 5-yr mean SWIID gross Gini (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OECD non-OECD KOFsoc KOFpol Turnout Non-mand 5-yr mean
Country-level clustered standard errors in parentheses
Within-group estimates, year fixed-effects included but not reported.
Interactionct refers to the joint effect of Political Equality and Proportional Representation.
Column 7 employs the fifth lag of independent variables.
Column 8 employs 5-yr averages of all variables in non-overlapping periods 1980-2010.
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Appendix
Table A1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Gross Gini (SWIID) 45.794 7.857 18.526 76.888 3532
Gross Gini (WIDER) 36.916 10.76 15.9 63.66 994
Net Gini (SWIID) 37.211 9.471 14.76 67.212 3532
Net Gini (WIDER) 37.067 10.183 15.9 63.66 1167
Absolute redist. 10.831 7.042 -5.294 26.89 1775
Relative redist. 23.686 15.192 -13.558 57.487 1775
Political Equality 2.293 0.828 0.05 3.8 3532
PR 0.427 0.495 0 1 3782
GDPpc (log) 8.585 1.056 6.038 10.53 2810
BMR 0.609 0.488 0 1 2780
Age of democracy 41.559 44.98 1 208 2960
Education 7.182 3.049 0.08 13.482 3447
Dependency ratio 6.426 4.355 1.05 23.159 7962
Inflation 49.195 553.277 -13.226 24410.98 3091
Trade 71.678 47.851 0.02 504.88 6408
Stock market 24.071 40.549 0 320.992 1883
FDI 2.968 8.113 -82.89 252.31 5325
KOFecon 48.69 17.092 10.22 93.59 6075
KOFsoc 45.798 20.832 6.73 90.73 6196
KOFpol 55.887 22.743 3.13 99.540 6196
Turnout 37.708 19.076 0 70 3254
Non-compulsory voting 0.799 0.401 0 1 3254
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Countries in the Sample
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bel-
gium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,Cameroon,
Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep.,
El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia The, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran
Islamic Rep. Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic,
Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela RB, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Table A2: Table of Data Sources
Variable Description Data Source
Political Equality Continuous measure assessing whether political power
is distributed independently of socio-economic position,
ranging from 0 to 4.
V-Dem database
PR Dichotomous variable with 1 indicating proportional
representation system and 0 otherwise.
Bormann and
Golder (2013)
GDPpc (log) Natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita, in constant 2010 US dollars
World Bank
BMR Dichotomous measure of democracy on the basis of con-
testation -i) the executive is directly or indirectly elected
in popular elections and is responsible either directly to
voters or to a legislature; ii) the legislature (or the execu-
tive if elected directly) is chosen in free and fair elections-
, and participation -iii) a majority of adult men has the
right to vote.
Boix et al.
(2013)
Dependency ratio Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependants (aged
under 15 or over 64) to the working-age population
(those aged 15-64). Percentage.
World Bank
Inflation Annual inflation rate V-Dem & Clio
Infra (clio-
infra.eu)
Trade Exports and imports as a percentage of GDP World Bank
Age of democracy Consecutive years of democratic regime type Boix et al.
(2013)
Education Average years of education among citizens older than
15.
V-Dem database
Stock market Domestic and foreign shares traded multiplied by their
respective matching prices as a percentage of GDP. Data
are end of year values.
World Bank
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Table A3: Table on Data Sources (cont.)
Variable Description Data Source
FDI Net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment)
in the reporting economy from foreign investors, as a
percentage of GDP.
World Bank
KOFecon KOF index of Economic Globalization Gygli et al.
(2018)
KOFsoc KOF index of Social Globalization Gygli et al.
(2018)
KOFpol KOF index of Political Globalization Gygli et al.
(2018)
Turnout Percentage of the total population who voted in the
same election
Vanhanen and
Lundell (2014)
No compulsory voting Dichotomous variable equal to 0 for compulsory voting
for those eligible to vote in national elections and 1 oth-
erwise.
V-Dem database
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Table A4: Changes in Electoral Systems
Algeria 1997 Kyrgyz Republic 2007
Bolivia 1997 Madagascar 1998
Bulgaria 1991 Moldova 1994
Bulgaria 2009 Morocco 2002
Bulgaria 2013 Poland 1991
Cameroon 1997 Portugal 1980
Sri Lanka 1989 Romania 2008
Croatia 2000 Sierra Leone 2002
Ecuador 1998 Turkey 1987
Ecuador 2002 Turkey 1995
Greece 2007 Ukraine 2006
Greece 2012 Macedonia FYR 2002
Italy 1994 Russian Federation 2007
Italy 2006 Venezuela RB 1993
Kazakhstan 2007
Figure A1: Political Equality and Redistribution (2005)
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Table A5: Cross-correlation of Political Variables
Variables PR Political Equality Democracy (BMR)
Political Equality 0.160
Democracy (BMR) 0.337 0.379
Age of democracy -0.069 0.241 -0.025
Table A6: Political Equality by Type of Regime
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Non-democracies
Political Equality 1.89 .892 .126 3.726
Democracies
Political Equality 2.556 .721 .094 3.799
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